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Introduction
Although Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) have been in the existence in different forms in the U.S capital markets since early 1920s, 1 their corporate structure became intensely debated only recently. A major trigger for the increased interest in SPACs is the innovation in their structure as the response to regulation from the Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) of the speculative blank check market in the late 1990s. Although few papers in the legal literature explained the characteristics of recent SPACs 4 , Jog and Sun (2007) and Boyer and Baigent (2008) were the first to vouch for the more intense research on SPACs in financial literature. Jog and Sun (2007) examine characteristics of SPACs and refer to the SEC's definition as "a blank check company is a development stage company that has no specific business plan, or purpose, or has indicated its business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company, other entity, or person." A SPAC is created to pool funds in order to finance a merger or acquisition opportunity within a set time-frame. The opportunity usually has yet to be identified. 1 "The American "investment" trusts functioned as blind speculative pools, administered in many cases by men of reputation and ability who were carried away by the universal madness. These new "creations" played a double role in intensifying the speculative orgy, for they were themselves both active speculators and active media of speculation." , Graham and Dodd (1934) . 2 In late 1990s the Security and Exchange Commission revoked licensees to more than 10 blank check market promoters at the time which lead to complete cease of their market. 3 Renaissance Capital confirms the percentage for 2007 and reports that SPACs were 35% of IPO activity in 2008 4 Hale (2007) , Heyman (2007) , Reimer (2007) , Sjostrom (2007 A SPAC is a clean shell company 6 that acquires public status through the unit IPO and is specifically formed to purchase one or more operating businesses over a certain amount of time, usually two years. Proceeds raised through the IPO are placed in escrow accounts with a credible financial institutions, and are kept there until SPAC founders are able to close a deal with potential targets. If an appropriate target is not found within the two-year period after the IPO, the SPAC is liquidated and funds from the escrow accounts are returned to investors. Units issued by SPACs are immediately tradable, while trading with warrants and shares starts after the date by which underwriter exercise overallotment rights. 7 On average, trading of warrants and common shares start four weeks after the IPO. SPACs used to be traded on AMEX and OTC Berger (2008) , Hale (2007) , Lewellen (2009), Floros and Travis (2011) .
The current literature on SPACs attempt to analyze various aspects such as; the institutional structure, the incentives of major stakeholders, the performance of issued securities and the factors determining successful mergers executed by SPACs.
Studies on the institutional structure and design of SPAC securities refer to Schultz (1993) , Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) and Garner and Marshal (2007) . Schultz (1993) models why companies use units --a bundle of common stock and warrants--during the initial public offering. And why they commit to issue more stocks in a future date at the warrant's exercise price. He finds that the major obstacles are: their small size, low earnings and low value of assets. Additionally, he sees units as the solution for the agency-cost problem resulting from the free cash flow awarded to managers at the time of the IPO. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) maintain that unit IPO solves the information asymmetry problems and enables companies that are considered risky by outsiders, to signal their true value. Garner and Marshal (2007) empirically test the predictions of Schultz (1993) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) . They find that risky firms assign a higher proportion of firm value to the warrants at the time of the IPO and increase the underpricing. Boyer and Baigent (2007) and Jog and Sun (2007) confirm the prediction from the baseline papers: SPACs' initial public offerings are relatively small in size, averaging less than $100 million. They also report that SPACs have a very low value of assets and earnings.
Contrary to Garner and Marshal (2007) , both Boyer and Baigent (2008) and Jog and Sun (2007) find that SPAC units do not experience any significant underpricing.
9 Chakraborty et al. (2011) provide a theoretical explanation for the possibility for the lack of the underpricing of unit IPOs.
They find the optimal ratio of stocks and warrants in a unit. 9 The finding that SPACs do not experience any underpricing is confirmed also in Lewellen (2009) , Thompson (2010) , and Ignatyeva et al. (2012) using larger sample of SPACs both in the U.S and European markets. Jog and Sun (2007) and Thompson (2011) Hale (2007) and later Thompson (2011) report that on average underwriters receive compensation of around 7% of gross proceeds obtained at the offering. Lewellen (2009) performance of 2.5% after the announcement of the merger, and attribute it to returns on the riskfree note rather than a signal of potential quality of the SPAC. Datar et al. (2012) , states that 10 At the early years of SPACs entrance to the market the unit would consist of two warrants and one share. 11 Major obstacle for the analysis of the complete financial structure of SPAC is the lack in the trading data on warrants.
operational performance of SPAC acquired firms are significantly inferior to their industry peers and to contemporaneous IPO firms. They report that after the merger, SPAC acquired companies have higher leverage, are smaller in size, have lower investment levels, and have lower growth opportunities than the firms that conduct a conventional IPO. While comparing SPACs' performances with the sample of similar IPOs, they report negative returns in the long term for both groups and underperformance of SPACs relative to the peer IPO's. In general, they recommend that investors stay away from SPACs. Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2012) as EarlyBirdCapital. They also find that the merger is more likely if a larger proportion of the money raised in the IPO is deposited in a trust fund.
This paper analyzes the forces that contribute to changes in the corporate design of SPACs by examining three issues. First, we explain the evolution of SPACs as a corporate structure.
Second, we test for the impact of SPAC stakeholders and their incentives due to changes in corporate structure of SPACs. And third, we examine the impact of SPAC stakeholders on the success of merger.
SPACs today are vastly different corporate structure than when they entered capital hedge funds earn a 33% annual return by selling the warrant after the IPO, and waiting for face value payment at liquidation. 12 The returns for leveraged investors are even higher if SPAC managers purchase additional shares before the merger in order to enhance an approval of an acquisition.
13 12 The strategy of selling warrant and waiting for redemption at liquidation date is known as "yield game." 13 In an attempt to proceed with the merger combination, SPAC promoters in their proxy statements before vote offer this kind of advice "Prior to exercising conversion rights, shareholders should verify the market price of common stock, as they may receive higher proceeds from the sale of their common stock in the public market than from exercising their conversion rights."
The paper proceeds as follows: Section two presents the data and summary statistics; section three explains some institutional characteristics of SPACs in the period 2003 until 2012; section four reports the empirical tests; and section five concludes.
Data
The data comes from various sources. The majority of the data on the institutional characteristics of SPACs are SEC website and the EDGAR database. SPACs are legally obliged to report to the SEC all issuance activities and any major corporate changes. Additionally, they are required to update the SEC with financial statements on a regular basis. We hand collect data on important characteristics of SPACs from their initial registration S-1 forms and update the data with information reported before the IPO event in the final prospectuses. The information from the SEC is summarized and represents our initial data. Furthermore, we cross check the data with updated public information about SPACs published by Morgan Joseph. 14 In case of discrepancy, we recheck the original filings with the SEC. For certain data points we use the COMPUSTAT files.
In addition to the institutional data, we collect data about the performance of all three types of SPAC securities. The data on daily performance are obtained mostly from CRSP return files and from various public providers of data. We collect data on merger dates and cross-check SPACs activity relative to the overall activity in the market for security issuance, the most successful year for SPACs was in 2008, when they constituted 35% of the total IPO market.
Characteristics of SPACs
This section presents the institutional characteristics and changes of the SPAC from 2003 to 2012. Characteristics of SPACs for the full sample are reported in Table 2 The threshold level represents the maximum percentage of SPAC shareholders that could redeem their shares before the merger is, on average 32.35%. The last institutional characteristics for which we have complete information is the amount of warrants purchased before the IPO by SPAC promoters. On average, they buy as a pre-commitment to the deal 1.43 million warrants.
In addition to the institutional characteristics, some performance measures are reported for SPACs that are currently trading. Recent unit trading price is lower than the average unit price across the sample (7.15 vs. 8.08). Recently traded warrants are also valued lower than the average warrant in the sample. Performance is summarized by the variable BHAR which calculates the absolute return to the investor that bought a portfolio. It consists of one unit of each of the 76 SPACs at the IPO, and is holding that portfolio until June 2012. It is documented that portfolio return is negative 48%. This result is very similar to the reported figure in Datar et al. (2002) .
Comparing SPACs institutional characteristics across the sample, we notice changes in their structure over time. 16 SPAC size in the second period is 2.5 times and 2.7 times larger than the size in period one and three, respectively. The data on number of underwriters in IPO syndicate shows a reduction of underwriters in a syndicate over time and possibly points towards greater specialization of underwriters. Panel B of Table 2 reports that the proceeds deposited in the trust accounts are increasing over time from 93% in the first, to 101% in the third period.
However, the threshold level that determine the percentage of investors that could block a merger increase dramatically from the first to the third period ( 
Merger Determinants and Characteristics

Institutional Characteristics of SPACs that Merged
The merger is the ultimate reason of the existence of SPACs. Upon a merger, all vested parties experience positive returns. If SPAC founders are not able to execute the merger before at the IPO determined date, they are required to return all proceeds kept in the trust accounts to its investors, and liquidate. 
Merger Determinants
We evaluate whether important corporate determinants of SPACs impact the probability of merger. Ten explanatory variables are used for evaluation and we discuss each of them as well as their expected impact on merger.
Underwriters have an important role in the success of SPAC. (2001) that merger, had to secure that only certain number of shareholders redeems their shares before the merger. In the first sub period for all SPACs the threshold was 20% of shareholders. This threshold rule was an important incentive for hedge funds and institutional investors to participate in the SPAC by playing a "yield game" and by focusing on short term returns.
18
Appendix B graphically depicts the changes in threshold level over time and shows relatively large increases. It is expected that higher threshold improves the probability of a merger.
Two important variables describe the commitment of SPAC promoters to the deal. One variable is the amount of proceeds in the trust fund. The second is the number of warrants that SPAC promoters buy and deposit before the IPO into trust account. SPAC promoters with initial investments of $25,000, purchase approximately 20% equity in a SPAC. As the result of these characteristics, every new SPAC investor experiences significant dilution. Miller (2008) reports of "warrant overhang" and explains how it leads to high dilution. He proposes that in the future, SPACs decrease the number of warrants in a unit. report approximately 30% dilution if no conversion rights are exercised. If the conversion threshold goes up to 20%, the dilution increases to more than 40%. Contributions of managers by purchasing warrants lower this dilution effect and we expect positive impact of the variable. We are uncertain for the effect of the percentage deposited in the trust.
The size of a SPAC is another determinant that potentially explains the success of a merger. Our summary statistics showed that the size varies from period to period and most likely corresponds with the state of the financial marker. We do not have clear expectation on the size effect. Although it seems that SPAC as a close to a 100% cash entity should benefit from its size, it is unknown what the demand is.
Additional demand factors could play a role. Following the same reasoning, we do not have clear expectation about the impact of unit IPO price on the merger.
18 It is well known attempt of Goldman Sachs in 2008 18 to create a "Super SPAC" that would focus on long term investors and offer them only ½ of a warrant in unit. Super SPAC did not happen but underwriters and SPAC founder increased the threshold number by the time.
Given the dilution effects and warrant overhang, it is expected that the decrease in the number of warrants per unit would be beneficial for SPAC. We are uncertain what effect warrants exercise price could have. Finally, we create dummy variable for the state of the IPO market, coding it 1 for the years when the IPO activity is above the average and 0 otherwise. By definition SPACs and other companies are competitors in the IPO market and the higher interest in other companies limit the ability of SPACs to raise capital. But it is possible that investor demand increases during "hot " years, enough to both increase the interest in SPACs and other companies.
We use logistic regression to determine the impact of SPAC characteristics on merger. The sample includes 163 companies with complete data points on all ten possible merger determinants. We exclude from the sample, 21 SPACs with unresolved corporate status at the time of final observation of the sample. We include seven SPACs that executed their IPO by issuing units with dual class shares, contrary to Cumming et al. (2012) . The reason for their inclusion is that the gross proceeds raised by a second class of shares are negligible in comparison to the size of the IPO, and that all other characteristics of these 7 SPACs are identical as the rest of the SPACs. Our observed variable is "merged" and is coded as 1 if the SPAC successfully merged and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in Table 4 .
The overall predictive power of the pre-IPO determinants of SPACs on merger is not high.
The only variables that have statistically significant impact at 5% level on mergers are the percentage of the funds deposited in the trust account and underwriter quality. The preliminary results show that further research is required to better understand the determinants of SPAC's success to merge.
Conclusions
We describe changes in the SPAC structure over time and document that in a relatively short time-frame they significantly redesigned their corporate structure. Additionally we test for the major determinants of SPAC mergers and find that the percentage of proceeds deposited in the trust after the IPO have impact on the probability of merger. Our analysis calls for additional empirical investigation and new information that could explain merger outcomes. 
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